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PREFACE
1. UN peacekeepers were taken from a police station by a mob
acting on a rumor about their involvement in raids of civilian
11, 11(a). The remaining Defendants, also UN
homes. R.
seized by ANVA insurgents after they hapwere
peacekeepers,
pened to land in a marsh in the area where bombing occurred.
R. 1 11. These Defendants were handed over to ANVA forces
intent on disrupting the fledgling democracy in Vineland and
hoarding oil revenues from that country's northern region. R.
2. Consequently, ANVA threatened the peacekeepers with summary execution without any evidence that they were involved in
the unfortunate deaths of innocent civilians, or other crimes al3, 11, 12. Such was the circumleged in this tribunal. R.
herein, Ridgeland and
Defendants
the
stances under which
Katonia soldiers, were surrendered to the International Criminal Court. Given the disruptive and coercive influences surrounding their surrender, the Defendants' appearance in the
ICC does not comport with the Rome Statute's guarantee that
trials in the ICC be conducted "with full respect for the rights of
the accused." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 64(2), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1037 [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. In the Trial Chamber, the Court should consider the
impropriety of the Defendants' surrender in determining
whether jurisdiction lies in this court or in a proper domestic
court.
2. When the crimes herein were allegedly committed, the UNVINE troops were acting in concert with and under direct orders as UN peacekeepers. R. 1 1. In so doing, they sought to
root out ANVA, which was intent on disrupting democracy in
the area. Due to the unfortunate consequences, borne out of the
retaliation against ANVA and other insurgent group raids on
UNVINE forces, a civilian mob seized the Defendants and
11. Katonia and Ridgeland
turned them over to ANVA. R.
insisted that their troops be released immediately and
threatened military action if they were held captive any longer.
R. 12. ANVA's subsequent surrender of the Defendants in order to prevent their own annihilation was, at the very least,
completely coercive and is thus a mockery of ICC's guarantee of
"enhancing international cooperation," through "effective prosecution." Rome Statute pmbl. The inevitable consequence of
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their surrender removes peacekeepers from the war torn region
and raises the spectre, voiced just months before in the United
Nations, that "others might use the [ICC] for political reasons to
investigate or prosecute its soldiers." R. 3. This Court should
correct the injustice done to these peacekeepers and decline jurisdiction for the reasons stated below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
3. In January 2002, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of 500 military and 600 civilian personnel to the Vineland region. R.
1. At the time, a nascent government was
apprehensively surviving in Vineland after more than four
years of continuous fighting in the region. Id. The Vineland
government and three ethnic groups had only recently signed a
peace agreement wherein each side agreed to form a democratic
coalition government whose power would be shared by all ethnic groups in the region. Id. In this context, the mission of the
UN peacekeepers, who are presently the Defendants in this
court, was to "verify cessation of hostilities, to set up a security
zone for civilians and refugees, and to make preparations for
the forthcoming elections in the various regions." Id.
4. The UN Security Council sought to renew peacekeeping efforts in July 2002. R.
3. Such discussions were conducted
alongside member nations' consideration about whether to
enter into the ICC's jurisdiction. Id. Some countries were concerned that "others might use the new Court for political reasons to investigate or prosecute its soldiers." Id. As a result,
the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1234
which granted a twelve-month exemption by the ICC to Vineland peacekeepers taking part in UN Peacekeeping operations.
S.C. Res. 1234, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1234 (July 12, 2002) [hereinafter Res. 1234]. At the time, the only countries participating
in these peacekeeping efforts were Ridgeland, Vineland and
Katonia. R. 1.
5. In June 2002, ANVA, an insurgent group from Vineland's
northern region, broke away from the coalition government because of dissatisfaction with the lack of ANVA seats in the new
government as well as the paucity of oil revenue shares it received from the northern region. R. 1 1. In attempts to ward off
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armed groups who attacked UNVINE forces July 10, 2002,
Katonia and Ridgeland launched a 10-day bombing campaign in
the area of the attacks. R. 6. These were in response to insurgent groups attacking UNVINE troops in the northern region
near Bridgetown. Id. Press reports indicated that the attack
was paid for by "foreign oil companies interested in keeping the
UN peacekeepers out of the region." R. 5. In order to ferret
out members of this clandestine insurgent group, UNVINE
members from both countries cordoned off the surrounding areas and conducted searches in order to find insurgents who
were connected to any group who attacked UNVINE. R. 6. In
this effort, they detained about 50 men and 20 boys to determine if insurgents were in their ranks. Id. It was reported that
four of them were tortured in another isolated area of the camp
and one of them died of a heart attack. Id. The record does not
indicate the person(s) who perpetrated the torture nor does it
indicate the degree of injury to the victims. The record, however, demonstrates that several ANVA training camps were destroyed and many insurgents were killed. Id. Paratroopers, it
is reported, stole personal property from houses during the
searches. Id.
6. On July 20, 2002, Katonia and Ridgeland ordered their para10. In doing so,
troopers to bomb ANVA headquarters. R.
Katonia and Ridgeland acted on Vineland intelligence reports
about the headquarters' location. Id. This bombing operation
destroyed three villages, killing three hundred civilians and seriously injuring 550 more. Id. On the same day, ANVA captured
three Katonia and two Ridgeland pilots whose planes landed in
11.
a nearby marsh due to a malfunctions in the planes. R.
Without any evidence linking them to the bombings, ANVA believed that the pilots were engaged in the bombing operations
that resulted in the deaths of civilians and accused them of
such. Id.
7. After the bombing campaign ended, 100 people stormed the
local police station where four Ridgeland military police were
stationed as trainers and consultants to the local police. R.
11. Four of the police were "recognized" by women in the mob
11(a). These
as men who took their husbands and sons. R.
insurANVA
to
over
handed
four were taken as prisoners and
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gents who had just captured the five pilots accused of the aerial
bombing raids. R.
11(b). This appeal follows.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE PROSECUTED FOR
THESE CRIMES WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THEY COMMITTED THESE CRIMES
EXCEPT INNUENDO FROM AN
INVESTIGATION THAT IS UNRELIABLE AND
WHOLLY INCOMPLETE.
8. For there to be jurisdiction in the ICC, there must be at least
some evidence that the Defendants herein committed the
crimes charged. Article 15 of Rome Statute states that a prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu. Here the prosecution either has not done so or has not produced evidence of
doing so. If the prosecutor concludes there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation, he shall submit this to the PreTrial Chamber for authorization of an investigation. Rome Statute art. 15(3) at 1011; Clarification 8/12/05. In either case, we
do not know who exactly is charged or what they are charged
with. Consequently, there is no evidence against Defendants
and jurisdiction in the ICC cannot follow.
A.

No Evidence from this Investigation Links the
Defendant Pilots to the 20 July nor the July 10th
Bombings Save that they were in the Wrong
Place at the Wrong Time
9. No evidence suggests that the pilots were involved in the July
20th bombing campaign that killed civilians. (In making this
argument, Defendants in no way concede that the charges involving the bombing of civilian areas are meritorious. Defendants make this argument based on their perceptions of what
they anticipate the charges will be given the shabby record
before this Court.) While there is evidence that some Katonian
and Ridgeland paratroopers were in the area, there is no evidence that the Defendants participated in the raids. The only
relevant points are purely circumstantial - that three Katonia
and four Ridgeland pilots landed in a nearby marsh the day of
the bombings in question. R. 11. There is no indication that
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they were even flying in a plane capable of dropping bombs. Indeed, there is no evidence that these pilots dropped any bombs
on any civilians nor is there any is evidence to indicates that
these pilots dropped any bombs whatsoever. The prosecution
has presumably done its investigation pursuant to Article 15.
Yet, many questions remain about the circumstances of this
bombing campaign. On this scarce record, Defendants cannot
be charged with such serious crimes as war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
10. There are still many reasonable hypotheses of innocence on
this Record that exculpate the Defendants of this bombing. We
are not told whether the prosecution investigated the reasons
the pilots were in the area. Were they humanitarian or sinister? The Record does not tell us. The pilots could have been
bringing humanitarian aid to civilians. They could have been
delivering supplies to UNVINE troops in the area. They could
even have been scouting the ground to ascertain the exact location of ANVA headquarters - the target of the bombing. Since
the evidence does not exclude such hypotheses of innocence, the
serious charges in this case must be dismissed. There is no
probable cause, reasonable suspicion or reliable evidence that
these pilots were in fact implicated in any of the charged offenses. Instead, there is only unreliable and incomplete evidence that doesn't meet this Court's standards of acceptable
evidence. The Defendants' planes simply crashed at wrong
place and at the wrong time.
11. There is no evidence linking the Defendants to the ten-day
bombing campaign, which began 10 July 2002. This campaign,
the Defendants concede, caused severe hardship to the civilian
population, principally ruining livestock and destroying farms.
However, no indication exists on this Record that the Defendants were in any way linked to this particular bombing. The
record is barren of any indication of whether the crash site
where Defendants were captured was anywhere near the area
of the ten day bombing campaign. The Record does not tell us
how great a distance separates the area of the ten day bombing
campaign from the site of the ANVA headquarters raid. Hence,
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the Defendants were
anywhere near the area of the ten day bombing campaign when
they were captured in a swamp in the area of the ANVA head-
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quarter raid. Nevertheless, as they anticipate, Defendants
stand charged of crimes premised on unreliable evidence of
their connection to the bombing campaign, a tenuous connection at best. For these reasons, this Court must dismiss the
charges against them.
B.

No Evidence from this Investigation Links the
Defendant Military Police Officers to the July 10th
Raids Where Property was Stolen, People were
Detained and Civilians were Tortured Since
the Prosecution has not Provided all the Facts to this

Court

12. The Ridgeland military police officers are also tenuously
linked to the raids in question. This Court is aware that the
military police officers were captured by a mob in a police station. This occurred when a few in the mob stormed a local police station upon rumors that four military police officers who
took part in the raid were stationed there. R. 11(a). The Prosecutor will contend that members of the mob "recognized" these
military police officers as having taken part in the kidnapping
of their husbands and sons. However, the Record does not read
this way. The prosecution describes a mob, one hundred strong,
who: "stormed a local police station where it was known that
four Ridgeland military police, who had taken part in the earlier house-to-house searches, were stationed as trainers and
consultants to the local police force." R. 11. (emphasis added).
Such innuendo is not enough to be charging UN peacekeepers
like these military police officers with such serious crimes as is
the Prosecutors' wont.
13. There was no credible reason for the mob to descend on the
police station where four of the Defendants were captured.
There was only a rumor that "it was known" that these four
officers who had taken part in the searches were stationed as
consultants to the local police force. R. 11. Further, the prosecution failed to inform the Court of the nature of the property
that was stolen. If knives, guns or grenades were stolen, such
confiscation would be absolutely legal since it would be well
within the mandate of the UN mandate under which Defendants were acting. See R. at 1.
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14. There is also no indication that these four officers had anything to do with the torturing of four people in a separate area
of the camp cordoned off by paratroopers. We are only told that
these people were tortured. We are not told whether they were
"in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator" which
the Rome Statute demands that the prosecution prove. Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 1st session, 3-10 Sept. 2002, Part II.B. Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3, art. 7(1)(f)(2) (2002) [hereinafter
Elements]. In addition, we are also not told about whether the
prosecution determined whether this torture was "inherent in
or incident to, lawful sanctions" which the Rome Statute recognizes as a defense. See Elements art. 7(1)(f)(3) Most importantly, there is no evidence to indicate that the Defendants
were the perpetrators of these crimes. The sum total evidence
of the crime of torture is provided by the record which states
that "[tihese detainees were taken to a detention compound
where they were observed in order to determine if there were
any insurgents amongst them. Four of the men were tortured in
an isolated area of the camp where there were no civilian witnesses." R. 6. Such scant evidence does not support a charge
of the crime against humanity of torture where it must be
proved that the tortured persons were the in custody of the perpetrator and the torture was not incidental to lawful sanctions.
Elements art. 7(1)(f)(2)-(3). Furthermore, this evidence does
not tell us the reasons for this torture, a requirement to prove
the war crime of torture. See Elements art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1(2)
("...for such purposes as: obtaining information or a confession,
punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reasons based
on discrimination of any kind.") In summation, the evidence
provided falls far short of providing this Court with enough evidence to proceed with these charges. Thus, they must be
dismissed.

11
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II.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN VINELAND AND
KATONIA AND, A UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
RESOLUTION PRECLUDE SURRENDER OF THE
DEFENDANTS AND THEIR PROSECUTION IN
THE ICC UNDER ARTICLE 98 OF THE ROME
STATUTE AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF LAW.
15. Vineland and Katonia entered into an agreement that prevents the surrender of their troops to the ICC. In 2002, the UN
Security Council expressly exempted Ridgeland and Katonia
troops from prosecution in the ICC by UN Security Resolution
1234. The Resolution was intended to give immunity to UN
peacekeepers in the region. Under these agreements, and given
the circumstances of the Defendants surrender, jurisdiction in
this court would be offensive to international norms. Therefore,
the Defendants here should not be prosecuted in the ICC.
A.

The UN Security Council Expressly Exempts
Ridgeland's and Katonia's Troops from Prosecution
Under the Rome Statute.

16. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1234 with respect to the UNVINE peacekeeping efforts and requested that
the International Criminal Court,
If a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over
acts or omissions. relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July
2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution
of any such case, unless the Security Council decide otherwise.
Res. 1234 1. The Security Council further expressed its intention to extend this resolution "each July 1" for additional years
"as long as may be necessary." Res. 1234
2. Therefore, any
UN forces within Vineland during this period are exempt from
"investigation or prosecution" from acts occurring during this
time period. Res. 1234 1. Forces from Ridgeland and Katonia
who were participating in UN exercises to combat forces such as
ANVA fit squarely within this protection.
17. Immunizing UN forces from prosecution in circumstances
such as these is consistent with a policy of providing UN forces
leeway in dealing with rebel insurgent forces - like the ANVA
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group in the case at bar. Such policy substantiates an inference
that the Security Council intended to extend Res. 1234's effects
past July 2003. The intention is expressed in the text of the
resolution which reads: "[The Security Council] [eixpresses the
intention to renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same
conditions each 1 July for further twelve-month periods for as
2. This Court should
long as may be necessary." Res. 1234
response to Katonia's
in
arose
agreement
the
bear in mind that
for political reaCourt
concern that "others might use the new
3. As a resons to investigate or prosecute its soldiers." R.
sult, the UN Security Council passed 1234 to grant soldiers
immunity from prosecution in the ICC in order to prevent the
fulfillment of Katonia's threat: "that it would not participate in
this or other UN peacekeeping missions." Id. Hence, this Court
should recognize the intention expressed in the body of the Resolution and effectuate Resolution 1234 as to bar the prosecution
of soldiers from Katonia and Ridgeland in this Court.
18. The Ridgeland and Katonian Defendants were acting under
the auspices of the UN and therefore fit squarely within Resolution 1234. Thus, they are exempt for the ICC's jurisdiction. The
UN Security Council, in January 2002, authorized UNVINE to
increase its deployment to Vineland to "verify cessation of hostilities, to set up a security zone for civilians and refugees, and
to make preparations for the forthcoming elections in the vari1. To ensure the attainment of these goals,
ous regions." R.
the UN requested member States "to contribute forces, civilian
personnel and equipment to UNVINE in order to carry out the
mandate." Id As a result, "Ridgeland and Katonia committed
and deployed soldiers and paratroopers to the UNVINE mission
in Vineland." Id. Hence, during the time in question, Ridgeland's troops were always acting in furtherance of a UN
peacekeeping mission at the UN's express invitation. Thus,
when armed groups attacked UNVINE forces outside Bridgetown on July 10, 2002, Ridgeland's response of sending "an additional 200 paratroopers to assist their solders," R. 6, was in
furtherance of effectuating a specific UN goal of "set[ing] up a
security zone for civilians and refugees." R. 1. Therefore, jurisdiction cannot follow.
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The Three Katonia Pilots Fit Squarely Within the
Vineland/Katonia Agreement.

19. Katonia and Vineland entered into an agreement that prevents the surrender of Katonia's troops to the ICC for prosecution. The agreement states:
When the Government of Vineland extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the other Party to a third country,
Katonia will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person
to the International Criminal Court by the third country, absent
expressed consent of the Government of Katonia.
Agreement Between the Government of Katonia and the Government of Vineland Regarding the Surrender of Persons to the
International Criminal Court, Katonia-Vineland, art. 4, Aug. 1,
2002. Katonia never gave any such consent. This agreement is
consistent with Article 98 of the Rome Statute regulating such
agreements. The first section of that article reads as follows:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to
the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a
third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
Rome Statute art. 98(1) at 1059. Here, the surrender of
Katonia's troops would cause Vineland to "act inconsistently
with its obligations under international law," in that such surrender would violate the agreement between Vineland and
Katonia. Id.
20. The ICC jurisdiction complements jurisdiction of the countries with which it is a signatory. Rome Statute pmbl. at 1002.
The Rome Statute contemplates such agreements. Id. Furthermore, any country that is a party to the Rome Statute can refuse to surrender under such agreements if the ICC does not
provide proper constitutional safeguards for criminal Defendants. While a Party State to the Rome Statute has an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute by
providing impunity to those accused of Rome Statute crimes,
the Party State does not defeat that object and purpose by entering into non-surrender agreements in accordance with Article 98. See Jeffrey S. Dietz, Comment, Protecting the

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/4

14

2005]

MEMORIAL FOR DEFENSE

Protectors: Can the United States Successfully Exempt U.S.
Persons from the International Criminal Courts with U.S. Article 98 Agreements?, 27 Hous. J. Int'l L. 137, 156-57 (2004).
21. Given that the surrender of the Katonia soldiers would violate the Rome Statute, prosecution after a surrender that was
in violation of international law would compound the injury.
Hence, to protect against an internationally violative surrender,
this Court should not prosecute Katonian troops. The Rome
Statute cannot be read to undermine the purpose of Art. 98
agreements, for which the Statute itself provides. One cannot
read the Rome Statute, because of an omission of the word
"prosecution," as prohibiting illegal surrender but allowing
prosecution that follows from an illegal surrender. Any such interpretation would be untenable and ICC jurisdiction cannot
follow.
C.

The Three Ridgeland Pilots and Four Military
Officers are Protected by the Article 98 Agreement.

22. Article 98 of the Rome Statute grants immunity to Ridgeland's troops since it is an extension of the arguments occurring
in the Security Council at the time of its passage concerning the
immunity of UNVINE troops in general. See R.
3. Article
98(2) of Rome Statute reads:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which
the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of
that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender. Rome Statute art. 98(2) at 1059.
23. The Article 98 agreement reflects a developing international
norm wherein States which send in troops as part of an UN
peacekeeping mission do not become subject to ICC jurisdiction
if they have not become signatories to the Rome Statute. Article 98 of the Rome Statute, UN Security Council Resolution
1234 and the Article 98 agreement between Katonia and Vineland reflect this international norm.
24. International norms are controlling on the ICC. Article 21
of the Rome Statute on Applicable Law states that when a stat-
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ute, the elements of a crime and its rule of procedure are not
available in a particular instance, "[t]he court shall apply:... In
the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict.
Rome Statute art. 21(b) at 1015. This being the case, the Article
98 agreement is binding on all states. International norms are
laws according to the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
("[n]othing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a
treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary
rule of international law, recognized as such."). Cf. Rome Statute art. 4(1) ("The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall have such legal capacity as may be necessary for
the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes."). Therefore, jurisdiction in this matter cannot stand.
III.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY UNDER THE ROME STATUTE.

25. Defendants' actions, even cast in the worst possible light, do
not fit the elements of crimes against humanity as defined by
Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Defendants' crimes were not directed against a civilian population, "committed as part of' or
"intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population," or committed with knowledge of the attack. Elements art. 7(1)(a). Hence, the crimes
against humanity charges cannot stand and jurisdiction in this
Court cannot follow.
A.

The Aerial Bombing Attacks by Defendant
Paratroopers were not Directed Against a Civilian
Population.

26. Pursuant to a UN objective, on July 20th 2002, Defendants
sought to bomb the headquarters of ANVA, "an insurgent group
from the northern region" of Vineland. R.
1. The bombing
campaign was developed with intelligence reports and aimed to
weaken ANVA forces that were destabilizing Vineland and
thwarting attempts made towards democracy in the country.
See R.
1-2. The bombing campaigns were also begun amid
the overriding aim to fulfilling the January 2002 objectives of
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the UN Security Council and to limit the ability of foreign oil
companies to discourage the UN from maintaining peace in the
5; Elements art. 7(1)(a)(2). The surrounding
region. See R.
circumstances should be taken into account by the Court in determining whether the Defendants had the requisite intent.
The Record clearly shows that civilians were indeed killed by
these bombings. However, viewed in light of the above factors,
the peacekeepers here never had the intent to bomb civilians.
27. This bombing campaign was directed at an area of haven to
insurgents who were attacking UNVINE forces, not at a civilian
target. Unfortunately, civilian deaths will always be a part of
violent conflict. Defendants were attempting to "verify cessation of hostilities" and stop ANVA from disrupting the peace
pursuant to a UN peacekeeping mission. R. 1. The UNVINE
bombing campaign was not directed against a civilian population but at ANVA headquarters. The focus of the bombing exculpates the Defendants herein since UNVINE targeted an
insurgent group and not civilians.
28. The bombing campaigns at issue should be viewed in light
of other bombing campaigns roundly condemned in modern
warfare. Consider the bombing operations at Dresden during
the Second World War where 200,000 civilians were killed in
two days, or the Blitzkrieg where Nazi's specifically targeted a
civilian population in the London area. Such bombing operations, known now as carpet bombing, where forces seek to bomb
large areas aiming to completely destroy an entire region.
Many infamous examples prove that such bombings have
targeted civilians in order to demoralize the enemy. For instance, the carpet bombing at Guernica during the Spanish
Civil war produced close to 2,000 civilian casualties. During the
Second World War, the blitz produced 43,000 deaths throughout the United Kingdom. Since in the case at bar the bombing
campaigns are qualitatively different from such atrocities, they
do not fall into this category of bombing deserving of criminalization. Here, we are dealing with UN peacekeepers seeking to
protect democracy in the region. This is quite different from the
Nazi's deliberately dropping bombs on civilians. Hence, this
Court should dismiss the charges.
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The Aerial Bombing Attacks by Defendant
Paratroopers were Neither Widespread nor
Systematic.

29. Bombings raids conducted by Katonia and Ridgeland were
done to discourage insurgent forces from the rampant killing of
soldiers who were trying to effectuate UN mandates. These
particular bombing operations were specifically directed at enemy headquarters. R.
10. Hence, they were not widespread
in the sense that they were directed against a multiplicity of
victims. There was only one intended victim here - the ANVA
headquarters.
Defendants concede that civilian deaths are
tragic. However, blame for such horror rests solely on the backs
of those who do not want peace in the region, not UN
peacekeepers, the group with the objective at stabilizing the
region.
C.

Defendants Did Not Have Knowledge that they were
Bombing Civilians Areas.

30. Defendants attacked ANVA headquarters based on the intelligence reports provided by the government of Vineland." R. I
10. The target was chosen because the insurgent group ANVA
was located there and not because innocent civilians lived there.
Defendants therefore did not "mean to engage in the conduct,"
as alleged. Rome Statute art. 30(2)(a) at 1018, nor were they
"aware that [civilians would be killed] in the ordinary course
of
events." Id. art. 30(2)(b) at 1018. Therefore, when evaluating
the intent of the Defendants in their bombing campaign, there
is nothing to support a contention that they were aiming at
harming civilians. Their intent was to cripple the enemy by
bombing a military target.
31. Even assuming arguendo that the intelligence reports were
incorrect or unreliable, it is important to note that the Defendants chose the bombing targets based on those reports. We can
infer that they intended the bombing to maximize ANVA casualties and damage to their headquarters. Such premeditation
does meet Article 30's requirement that one have "awareness
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events." Rome Statute, art. 30(3) at 1018.
Therefore, Defendants did not know nor did they intend to
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bomb civilians and these charges are unsupportable by the
evidence.
IV.

AERIAL ATTACKS BY DEFENDANT PARATROOPERS
DO NOT SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF WAR
CRIMES.

32. Defendants' actions in furthering the peacekeeping efforts of
the UN do not constitute war crimes. Even viewed in the worst
light, Defendants' actions did not occur during an international
armed conflict. Consequently, their actions cannot fit the elements of war crimes. See Elements art. 8(2)(a). Therefore, ICC
Jurisdiction should not follow.
A.

The Bombings did not Occur During an International
Armed Conflict.

33. The conflict in question was between a UN peacekeeping
group and an insurgent group from the northern region of Vineland. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ruled that an armed conflict exists "whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-T, 70 (May 7, 1997). That Ridgeland and Katonia
troops were involved does not equate with Ridgeland and
Katonia being involved as states. Katonia and Ridgeland each
lent large numbers of troops to a UN peacekeeping effort and,
as such, their forces were under the control and direction of the
UN during the times in question. Here the "conflict" was between those who want peace in Vineland and those who have an
interest in having conflict in the region. Katonia and Ridgeland
forces were present to effectuate UN mandates to "verify cessation of hostilities, to set up a security zone for civilians and refugees, and to make preparations for the forthcoming elections in
the various regions." R. 1 1. In doing so, Katonia's and Ridgeland's forces were acting under the auspice of UN as peacekeeping forces and not, as such, under direction of the sovereign's
military commanders. Therefore, this was not an "international
conflict" in the common or the international meaning of the
term. When the fighting began between Katonia and Ridgeland
and the unidentified armed groups, the conflict did not become
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an international conflict but remained a conflict between UN
forces and a common insurgent group. Hence, given that the
conflict was not between states or governmental authorities,
there is no international conflict in existence here.
B.

The Charges against Defendants Involving the
Impairment of Liberty of any Kind do not
Withstand any Scrutiny.

34. Detaining 70 people while searching for insurgents does not
fit the elements of deportation and forcible transfer of population 7(1)(d), imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, 7(1)(e), unlawful deportation and transfer
8(2)(a)(vii)-l, and unlawful confinement 8(2)(a)(vii)-2. There is
neither a forcible transfer nor an unlawful transfer since the
conduct was not "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population," nor did the
perpetrators know "that the conduct was part of or intended...
to be a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population." See Elements art. 7(1)(d)(5),
7(1)(e)(5). Also, the crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer
as well as the crime of unlawful confinement cannot stand
since, as outlined above, Defendants' alleged conduct did not
take "place in the context of [nor] associated with an international armed conflict." See Elements art. 8(2)(a)(vii)-l,
8(2)(a)(vii)-2. The detainees in this case were temporarily detained as part of a UN peacekeeping effort. Specific to the instances alleged here, the detainees were searched in order to
determine if insurgents were among the 70 detainees. As such,
Defendants' actions, as alleged, do not fit the elements of Article
7(1)(e) which states that the perpetrator imprisons persons or
otherwise severely deprives persons of their liberty. These detentions were temporary and, as such, cannot fit the war crime
definition of unlawful confinement.
35. Assuming, arguendo, that the Defendants detained the complainants herein, such detention was in furtherance of a UN
mission to weed out insurgents in a very unstable area of the
world. The search and detention was in response to a surreptitious attack by armed forces believed to be supported by "foreign oil companies interested in keeping the UN peacekeepers
out of the region." R. 5.
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36. Given that the Defendants were acting under a UN sanctioned peacekeeping effort, any investigation which arose out of
it, was in furtherance of such. There can be no charge of imprisonment or unlawful detention against law enforcement officers
acting under UN authority. Policy dictates that UN
peacekeepers should have every opportunity to impose security
in the area. Conversely, any insurgent groups should not be
able to seek recourse against those whose mission it is to "verify
cessation of hostilities, to set up a security zone for civilians and
refugees, and to make preparations for the forthcoming elections in the various regions." R. 1. Therefore, the charges alleging impairment of liberty cannot stand.
C.

Defendants did not Torture any of the Alleged

Detaine.
37. There is no evidence here that those who were tortured were
civilians. Also, as outlined above, the perpetrator did not know
"that the conduct was part of or intended ... to be a part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population." See Elements art. 7(1)(f)(5). Indeed, the alleged torture occurred during a UNVINE offensive to counter ANVA's
efforts, acting in concert with foreign oil companies, to keep "the
UN peacekeepers out of the region." R. 5. The alleged torture
came during a raid, the purpose of which was to find insurgents
in the region. Furthermore, we are only told that the victims
herein were "tortured." R. 6, and not whether they were "in
the custody or under the control of the perpetrator." Elements
art. 7(1)(f)(2). Nor can it be assumed that the "pain and suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental, to lawful sanctions." Id. art. 7(1)(f)(3). Hence, these
charges cannot stand.
D.

Defendants did not Pillage, Destroy or Target
Civilian Property.

38. Defendant paratroopers were acting under direct UN order
and any of their actions should be viewed in furtherance of UN
directives. The prosecutor may allege that "personal property
had been stolen by the paratroopers while conducting the
6. However, the evidence does
house-to-house searches." R.
not indicate that the property confiscated, at the time, could not
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have led to the capture of ANVA troops. Nor does the evidence
establish whether the troopers had a reason to believe that the
property taken in the raids could not have been used as weapons to harm UNVINE forces. R.
5. Given this context, the
paratroopers must take all efforts to protect themselves and
other civilians from attacks at the hands of any other unidentified forces, ANVA, or otherwise. Therefore, any expropriation
that occurred was not contemplated by the Rome Statute which
does not limit "existing or developing rules of international
law." Rome Statute art. 10 at 1010. It is important to reiterate
that, as stated above, the alleged pillaging did not take "place in
the context of and was [not] associated with an international
armed conflict." Elements art. 8(2)(b)(xvi)(4). Therefore, jurisdiction for prosecution of this crime cannot stand.
39. With regard to the destruction of property allegations, the
Prosecution cannot prove that this was the result of a "widespread and systematic effort." Elements art. 7(1)(f)(5). Furthermore, the prosecution lacks evidence that shows that the
Defendants are the perpetrators of the crime. We are only told
that the "personal property had been stolen." R. 6.
CONCLUSION
International Treaties and Agreements, as well as a UN Security Council Resolution itself, bar the ICC from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. The evidence, even viewed in its most
damning light for the Defendants, does not establish any reliable foundation for prosecution. Accordingly, this Court should
dismiss the charges against the Defendants.
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